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Abstract. Process mining is a family of techniques for analysing busi-
ness processes based on event logs extracted from information systems.
Mainstream process mining tools are designed for intra-organizational
settings, insofar as they assume that an event log is available for pro-
cessing as a whole. The use of such tools for inter-organizational process
analysis is hampered by the fact that such processes involve independent
parties who are unwilling to, or sometimes legally prevented from, sharing
detailed event logs with each other. In this setting, this paper proposes an
approach for constructing and querying a common type of artefact used
for process mining, namely the frequency and time-annotated Directly-
Follows Graph (DFG), over multiple event logs belonging to different
parties, in such a way that the parties do not share the event logs with
each other. The proposal leverages an existing platform for secure multi-
party computation, namely Sharemind. Since a direct implementation
of DFG construction in Sharemind suffers from scalability issues, the
paper proposes to rely on vectorization of event logs and to employ a
divide-and-conquer scheme for parallel processing of sub-logs. The paper
reports on an experimental evaluation that tests the scalability of the
approach on real-life logs.
Keywords: Process Mining · Privacy · Secure Multi-Party Computation
1 Introduction
Analysing business processes based on event logs extracted from information
systems through process mining techniques [1] becomes increasingly popular
in industry. It enables organizations to optimize their processes and achieve
their strategic goals, e.g., realizing cost-efficient process execution. However, in
practise, many business processes are not restricted to a single organization,
but are executed by several collaborating organizations. We call such processes
inter-organizational business processes. An example of such a process is given
in Figure 1, which illustrates the ground handling of an aircraft. The process
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Fig. 1: The example of an aircraft ground handling process.
includes two independent parties, the airline and the ground handler (called
“airport” in the model).
Due to confidentiality concerns as well as privacy regulations, such as GDPR4
and HIPAA5, it is not always possible for organizations to share their process data
with each other. Indeed, exchanging event logs may reveal personal information
of customers and expose business secrets. As a consequence, common techniques
for process mining cannot be employed for inter-organizational business processes,
despite the fact that these processes can have a large impact of the core operation
of a business. With reference to the aforementioned scenario, for instance, it
is well-known that the orchestration of ground handling activities is of crucial
importance for both involved parties. It determines the number of flights an
airport can operate and the number of flights an airline can offer per aircraft.
In this paper, we focus on the question of how to enable process mining for
inter-organizational business processes without requiring the involved parties to
share their private event logs or trust a third party. To this end, we propose an ar-
chitecture for process mining based on secure multi-party computation (MPC) [38].
In essence, MPC aims at the realization of some computation over data from
multiple parties, while exposing only the result of the computation, but keeping
the input data private. We consider the setting of an MPC platform where the
involved parties upload their event logs to a network of compute nodes. Before
the upload, secret sharing algorithms locally split each single data value into
different parts (i.e., shares) that are then stored at different nodes. Since each
share does not provide any information about the original data, the uploaded
event log is encrypted and exposed neither to the platform operator nor other
involved parties. Nonetheless, the MPC platform enables the computation over
the encrypted data through protocols for result sharing among the nodes.
We realise the above architecture to answer analysis queries that are common
in process mining. Specifically, we show how to construct a frequency and time-
annotated Directly-Follows Graph (DFG), which is a starting point for process
discovery algorithms [5] and for answering various performance analysis questions,
4 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj
5 https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/
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such as finding the top-k bottlenecks (i.e. activities with longer cycle time) or
the top-k most frequent hand-offs. We implement our proposed architecture
using the Sharemind platform [9]. In order to tackle scalability issues that would
be imposed by a naive implementation, we employ vectorization of event logs
and propose a divide-and-conquer scheme for parallel processing of sub-logs. We
test the effectiveness of these optimisations via an experimental evaluation with
real-world event logs.
The remaining paper is structured as follows. Section 2 lays out related work
and the background for this work. Section 3 introduces our architecture for privacy-
preserving inter-organizational process mining along with the optimizations
needed for efficient implementation. An experimental evaluation is presented in
Section 4, before Section 5 concludes the paper.
2 Background and Related Work
In the remainder, we review work on privacy-preserving process mining, inter-
organizational process mining, and secure multi-party computation.
2.1 Privacy-Preserving Process Mining
The necessity of privacy-preserving process mining, due to novel legal development
such as the GDPR, was recently discussed in [27,28]. In general, two approaches
have been established [16]: (i) anonymizing the event data to apply standard
techniques to it, and (ii) directly incorporating privacy considerations in process
mining techniques. The anonymization of event logs from one organization may be
done using PRETSA [17], an algorithm to ensure the established privacy notions
of k-anonymity [33] and t-closeness [24]. These notions, based on data similarity,
are widely adopted and offer protection against certain attacks [37], like the
disclosure of the identity of individuals involved in the dataset. Approaches based
on cryptography [13,30] have also been proposed. Following the idea to incorporate
privacy guarantees directly in process mining techniques, algorithms for privacy-
preserving process discovery [26,34,35] and the privacy-aware discovery of resource
roles [29] have been proposed. Recently, techniques for privacy-preserving process
mining, following either of the aforementioned paradigms, have been made
available for a large audience with the tool ELPaaS [6].
All of the aforementioned techniques, with the exception of [35], concern
process mining for a single organization and have not yet adopted or evaluated for
an inter-organizational setting. While the focus of [35] is on an inter-organizational
setting, the approach targets solely the generation of a process model, while our
aim is answering a wide range of analysis queries about a business process.
2.2 Inter-Organizational Process Mining
Several approaches consider inter-organizational process mining, with a focus on
process model discovery, but neglect privacy aspects, see [31,39]. Another line of
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related research in inter-organizational process mining attends to compare the
same process in different organizations [2,12,36].
The specific problem of privacy in inter-organizational process mining has
been addressed by Liu et al. [25]. They provide a respective framework based on
the assumption that a trusted third party exists. They then focus on discovery
of process models. In our work, we do not assume the existence of such a trusted
third party and target the computation of answers to analysis queries over event
logs in a privacy-preserving manner.
2.3 Secure Multi-Party Computation
Secure Multi-party Computation (MPC) [19] is a cryptographic functionality
that allows n parties to cooperatively evaluate (y1, . . . , yn) = f(x1, . . . , xn) for
some function f , with the i-th party contributing the input xi and learning the
output yi, and no party or an allowed coalition of parties learning nothing besides
their own inputs and outputs.
There exist a few different approaches for constructing MPC protocols. Ho-
momorphic secret sharing [32] is currently the most common basis for MPC
protocols [14,18]. In such protocols, the arithmetic or Boolean circuit representing
f is evaluated gate-by-gate, constructing secret-shared outputs of gates from
their secret-shared inputs. Each evaluation requires some communication between
parties (except for addition gates), hence the depth of the circuit determines
the round complexity of the protocol. On the other hand, there exist protocols
with low communication complexity [10,3,15], allowing the secure computation
of quite complex functions f , as long as the circuit implementing it has a low
multiplicative depth.
The complexity of MPC protocols is heavily dependent on the number of
parties jointly performing the computations. Hence the typical deployment of
MPC has a relatively small number of compute nodes, also known as computation
parties, (typically just 2 or 3) actually running the protocols for evaluating gates,
while an unbounded number of parties may contribute the inputs and/or receive
the outputs of the computation [21]. There exist frameworks that support such
deployments of MPC, they have APIs to simplify the development of privacy-
preserving applications [4]. One of such frameworks is Sharemind [9], whose main
protocol set [10] is based on secret-sharing among three computing parties. In this
paper, we build on top of Sharemind and its large number of primitive protocols
and subroutines [8], but our techniques are also applicable to other secret sharing
based MPC systems. Sharemind framework simplifies our work by offering the
SecreC language [7] for programming privacy-preserving applications, abstracting
away these details of cryptographic protocols that make sense to be abstracted
away.
3 Multi-Party Computation based Process Mining
This section introduces our techniques for process mining based on secure multi-
party computation. Section 3.1 first clarifies our model for inter-organizational
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process mining including the required input data and the obtained analysis results.
We then introduce our architecture for realizing the respective analysis using
secure multi-party computation in Section 3.2. In Section 3.3, we elaborate on
vectorization and parallelization to improve the efficiency of our approach.
3.1 Model for Inter-organizational Process Mining
We consider a model in which an event log L = {e1, . . . , en} is defined as a set of
events e = (i, a, ts), each capturing a single execution of an activity a at time
ts, as part of a single instance i of the business process. Grouping events by the
latter and ordering them according to their timestamp enables the construction
of traces t = 〈e1, . . . , em〉, i.e., single executions of the process, so that we refer
to i also as the trace identifier.
For an inter-organizational business process, an event log that records the
process execution from start to end is commonly not available. Rather, different
parties record sub-logs, built of events that denote activity executions at the
respective party. To keep the notation concise, we consider a setting in which
two parties, Ia and Ib, execute an inter-organizational process, e.g., the airport
and the airline in our motivating example. Then, each of the two parties records
an event log, denoted by La and Lb. Each of these logs is the projection of L on
the events that denote activity executions at the respective parties Ia and Ib.
We assume that each activity can only be executed by one of the parties, so that
this projection is defined unambiguously.
For the above setting, we consider the scenario that the parties Ia and Ib
want to answer some analysis queries Q over the inter-organizational event log L,
yet without sharing their logs La and Lb with each other. More specifically, we
focus on analysis queries that can be answered on a frequency or time-annotated
DFG of the inter-organizational process. The basic DFG captures the frequencies
with which the executions of two activities have been observed to directly follow
each other in a trace. Moreover, we consider temporal annotations of the directly-
follows dependencies in terms of time between the respective activity executions.
Queries over the frequency and time-annotated DFGs allow us to analyze the
main paths of the process, the rarely executed paths, as well as the activities
that most contribute to delays in a process. Note though that only query answers
are to be revealed whereas the actual DFG shall be kept private.
Formally, the time-annotated DFG is captured by an |A|×|A| matrix, where A
is the set of all possible activities of the process. Each cell contains a tuple (c,∆).
The counter c represents the frequency with which a directly-follows dependency
has been observed in L, i.e., for the cell (a1, a2) it is the number of times that two
events e1 = (i1, a1, ts1) and e2 = (i2, a2, ts2) follow each other directly in some
trace (i.e., i1 = i2) of L. Also, ∆ is the total sum of the time passed by between
all occurrences of the respective events, i.e., ts2 − ts1 for the above events.
In inter-organizational process mining, the aforementioned time-annotated
DFG cannot be computed directly, as this would require the two parties to share
and integrate their sub-logs.
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3.2 MPC Architecture for Process Mining
To enable inter-organizational process mining without requiring parties to share
their event logs with each other, we propose an architecture based on secure
multi-party computation (MPC). As outlined in Figure 2, we rely on a platform
for MPC (in our case Sharemind [9]) that takes the event logs of the participating
parties, i.e., La and Lb, as secret-shared input. Inside the MPC platform, the
respective data is processed in a privacy-preserving way in order to answer
analysis queries over the time-annotated DFG computed from that data.
Secure Processing
Inside MPC Platform
Party
A
Party
B
Import
CSV
Top K most frequent.
Top K slowest activities
Top K most effort consuming
Parallel Sort
DFG Matrix
Calculation
Query Engine
Combine
Revealing
Query
Results
Import
CSV
Fig. 2: MPC Architecture for Process Mining.
We summarize the functionality realized in the MPC platform as follows:
Combination. The parties upload their event logs La and Lb to the MPC platform
in a secret-shared manner. That is, the values (i, a, ts) of each event (encoded
as integers) are split into shares, which do not provide any information on
the original values and are stored at different nodes of the platform. This
way, each party can only see the total number of records uploaded by each
party, but not the particular data. Subsequently, the logs are unified creating
a single log of events L.
Sorting. To calculate the annotated DFG, we have to determine which events
follow each other in a trace by grouping the events by their trace identifier
and ordering them by their timestamp. Since the trace identifier is secret-
shared, we cannot group events directly. Instead, we use a privacy-preserving
quicksort algorithm [8,20] as implemented in Sharemind to sort the events by
their trace identifier. Applying the same algorithm also to the secret-shared
timestamps then ensures that the events of the same trace follow each other
in the order of their timestamps.
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DFG matrix calculation. Next, we construct the DFG matrix inside the MPC
platform, keeping it secret. Since the information on the activity of an event
is secret-shared, we cannot simply process the events of traces sequentially
as the matrix cell to update would not be known. Hence, we adopt a one-
hot encoding for activities, so that each possible activity is represented
by a binary vector of length |A|. To mask the actual number of possible
activities, the set over which the vector is defined may further include some
padding, i.e., the vector length can be chosen to be larger than |A|. Now, if
we compute the outer product of such vectors for activities a1 and a2, we
get a mask matrix M such that M [a1, a2] = 1, while all other entries are 0.
For all sequential pairs of events in the sorted log, we sum up these matrices
together to get the frequency count c of the directly-follows dependency
for (a1, a2). Multiplying M by the difference of corresponding timestamps
further enables us to derive the total sum of time passed, i.e., ∆, between the
respective activity executions. Technically, the outer product is a function
that is realized as a protocol over secret-shared data in Sharemind, and its
run-time complexity is linear in |A| [23].
However, the above approach could mix up events of different traces. We
therefore also compute a flag b that is 1 if the trace identifiers of two events
are equivalent, and 0 otherwise. Then, we multiply the mask matrix M by
b, so that the values of M are ignored if b = 0. Again, the functionality for
comparison and multiplication can be traced back to predefined protocols in
Sharemind [10].
Algorithm 1 summarizes computation of the annotated DFG from the sorted,
combined log L, where [[·]] denotes a secret-shared data value.
Query answering. A query Q defines a subset S of the annotated DFG, which is
generated by the MPC platform and revealed to the participating parties.
Through sharing solely the S, but not the complete annotated DFG, we
are able to limit the amount of information each party can learn about the
process. As an example, consider the query to derive the top-5 most frequent
activities. Based on the secret-shared DFG, the respective activities may be
identified through grouping and sorting the events, similar to the procedure
outlined above, which is again based on the predefined protocols of an MPC
platform such as Sharemind.
3.3 Performance Optimizations
Inter-organizational process mining using the above general architecture might
suffer from scalability issues. The reason is that privacy-preserving computation
through protocols over secret-shared data is inevitably less efficient than com-
putation in plain. Hence, even for functions that have a generally low run-time
complexity (O(n) for the combination, O(n log(n)) for the sorting, O(nm2) for
the calculation of the annotated DFG, where n is the log length and m is the
number of activities), there is a non-negligible overhead induced by MPC. For
instance, a naive realisation of the quicksort algorithm to sort events would
require O(n log(n)) rounds of communication between the nodes and O(n log(n))
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Algorithm 1 Calculating the combined, annotated DFG([[L]])
INPUT: The sorted, combined event log [[L]] of length n.
OUTPUT: Annotated DFG comprising a count matrix [[G]] and a time matrix [[W ]].
1: Initialize [[G]] = 0, [[W ]] = 0
2: for all j ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1} do
3: [[b]]← ([[L[j − 1].i]] = [[L[j].i]]); //compute the flag for traces
4: [[M ]]← [[b]] · ([[L[j − 1].a]]⊗ [[L[j].a]]); //compute the outer product
5: [[G]]← [[G]] + [[M ]]; //incorporate the current dependency
6: [[W ]]← [[W ]] + [[M ]] · ([[L[j].ts]]− [[L[j − 1].ts]]); //Incorporate the time lag
7: return [[G]], [[W ]]
value comparisons per round [20]. We therefore consider two angles to improve
the efficiency of the analysis, namely vectorization and parallelization.
Vectorization. Computation that adopts a single-instruction multiple-data (SIMD)
approach is highly recommended in MPC applications. Since MPC assumes con-
tinuous interaction between distributed nodes, the number of communication
rounds shall be reduced as much as possible. For instance, while computing n
multiplications sequentially would result in n rounds of communication, one may
alternatively multiply element-wise two vectors of length n, for which one round
of network communication is sufficient. Sharemind offers efficient protocols for
such vector-based functions [22,23].
Parallelization. Further runtime improvements are obtained by parallelizing
the algorithm itself. Again, our goal is to reduce the number of rounds of
communication among the nodes of the MPC platform. We therefore split the
input data into chunks, such that all chunks can be processed independently
from each other. In our scenario, this is done by grouping the party logs by
trace, or by a group of traces, generating an annotated DFG for group, and
finally integrating the different DFGs. Since events with the same trace will
never occur in different chunks, instead of sorting one log of length n, we will
need to sort c chunks of length n/c each. Since communication complexity of a
privacy-preserving quicksort is O(n · log n) [20], this improves efficiency.
The above approach raises the question of determining the size of the chunks.
Separating each trace reveals the total number of events of that trace provided
by a party, which may be critical from a privacy perspective. On the other hand,
a small chunk size reduces the overhead of sorting. This leads to a trade-off
between runtime performance and privacy considerations.
However, in our current implementation, it is necessary that all chunks have
the same length, as Sharemind allows parallel sorting only for equal-length vectors.
Therefore, we apply a padding to the traces in the log, adding dummy events (for
which the activity is represented by an empty vector in the one-hot encoding, so
that the events are ignored for the DFG calculation) until the number of events
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of the longest trace is reached. Such padding may be employed locally, by each
party, and also has the benefit that the length of individual traces is not revealed.
4 Evaluation
We implemented the proposed approach on top of the Sharemind multi-party
computation platform.6 The source code of our implementation is available
at https://github.com/Elkoumy/shareprom. The implementation is written
using the SecreC programming language supported by Sharemind.
Using this implementation, we conducted experiments to evaluate the proposed
approaches in order to address the following research questions:
RQ1: How do the characteristics of the input event logs influence the performance
of the secure multi-party computation of the DFG?
RQ2: What is the effect of increasing the number of parallel chunks on the
performance of the multi-party computation of the DFG?
4.1 Datasets
The proposed approach is designed to compute the DFG of a process where the
event log is distributed across multiple parties, each party being responsible for
executing a subset of the activities (i.e. event types) of the process. We are not
aware of publicly available real-life datasets with this property. We identified a
collection of synthetic inter-organizational business process event logs [11] but
these logs are too small to allow us to conduct performance experiments (a
few dozen traces per log). On the other hand, there is a collection of real-life
event logs of intra-organizational processes comprising logs of varying sizes and
characteristics.7. From this collection, we selected three logs of increasing size
and complexity (cf. Table 1):
Credit Requirement This event log comes from a process for background
checking for the purpose of granting credit at a Dutch bank. It contains of
short traces with only 8 event types. It has a simple control-flow structure:
All traces follow the same sequence of activities.
Traffic Fines This event log comes from a process to collect payment of fines
from traffic law violations at a local police office in Italy. It consists of a
higher number of traces (and distinct pathways) but the traces are short and
the number of event types is small.
BPIC 2017 This event log captures a loan application process at a Dutch
financial institute. It contains traces with a higher length than the other two
and contains a larger number of event types.
To simulate an inter-organizational setting, we use a round-robin approach to
assign each event type (activity) in the log to one of two parties. Hence, each
6 https://sharemind-sdk.github.io
7 https://data.4tu.nl/repository/collection:event_logs_real
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Table 1: Event Logs for Evaluation
Event Log # Events # Cases # Activities # Events in Case
Avg Max Min
BPIC 2017 1,202,267 31,509 26 38.16 180 10
Traffic Fines 561,470 150,370 11 3.73 20 2
Credit Requirement 50,525 10,034 8 15 15 15
party executes half of the event types. The experiments were timed-out at 5
hours. The BPIC 2017 could not be handled with this time-out. Accordingly, we
selected 1000 traces randomly from this event log to enable processing of the log
below the time-out.
4.2 Experimental Setup
To answer the above questions, we use three performance measures:
◦ Latency. We define latency as the amount of time needed to transform the
event logs of the two parties securely into an annotated DFG. We report
both, the total execution time and the time needed by the chunk-based sort.
◦ Throughput. We define throughput as the number of events that the system
can process per minute.
◦ Communication Overhead. We define the communication overhead as
the amount of data transferred between the computing parties during the
multi-party computation. We measure the average of the data sent and
received. We report the values individually for each compute node.
We performed five runs of each experiment. We report the average maximum
values for latency and the average value for both throughput and communication
overhead, across the five runs. We used Nethogs8 to measure the communication
overhead and we report the average value per compute node. The experiments
were run in an environment with three physical servers as compute nodes. All of
them use the same Sharemind setup. Each server has an AMD Processor 6276
and 192 GB RAM and all the servers are connected using a 1GB Ethernet switch.
The experiments focus on the time needed to construct the annotated DFG,
since it is the most sophisticated and time-consuming portion of the proposed
analysis pipeline, due to the communicating required between the compute nodes.
Once the annotated DFG is available, stored in a secret-shared manner, the
calculation of the actual queries has a lower complexity.
4.3 Results
Latency Experiment. In Figure 3, we illustrate the observed execution time
when varying the number of chunks used in the parallelization. We plot a bar
8 https://github.com/raboof/nethogs
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Fig. 3: Latency Experiment: Execution Time vs no. of Chunks.
for each chunk size. Each bar represents the execution time of parallel sort in
blue and the execution time of the DFG calculation in orange. From Figure 3, we
conclude that the execution time decreases with an increasing number of chunks,
due to the parallel sorting of chunks. We also note that the execution time for
the DFG calculation stays constant. Our results are consistent for all event logs.
Regarding RQ1, we summarise that the proportion of execution time between
sorting and DFG calculation differs based on the event log characteristics. For
the log with the largest number of event types (BPIC2017) the DFG calculation
makes up the largest proportion of the total execution time, while the proportion
is significantly lower for the logs with a smaller number of event types. A possible
explanation for this finding is the increasing size of the vectors required to
represent each activity, due to our bit-vector representation. Such increase results
in more computational heavy calculations.
Regarding RQ2, we conclude that the latency decreases for event logs with
an increasing number of chunks.
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Throughput Experiment. In Figure 4, we report the number of processed events
per second when varying the number of chunks. We find a consistent improvement
for the throughput across all event logs. However, our results also correlate with
the finding of Figure 3, since throughput and latency correlate with each other.
The dataset with the highest decrease in latency (Credit Requirements) is also the
event log with the highest increase in throughput, while it is the other way around
for the event log with the lowest decrease in latency (BPIC2017). Furthermore,
these results provide additional evidence for RQ2 and strengthen our argument
that an increasing number of chunks improves the performance.
Credit Requirement BPIC 2017 Traffic Fines
1 10 100 1000 10000 1 10 100 1000 10000 1 10 100 1000 10000
0
250
500
750
1000
No. of Chunks
D
at
a 
Tr
a
n
sf
e
re
d 
O
ve
r 
th
e 
ne
tw
o
rk
(M
B)
server
server1
server2
server3
Fig. 5: Communication Overhead Experiment: Data Transferred vs no. of Chunks.
Communication Overhead. In Figure 5, we present the amount of data transferred
to each server, again also varying the number of chunks. We observe that the
communication overhead decreases with an increase in the number of chunks.
These findings confirm our earlier findings regarding RQ2. In summary, a higher
number of chunks leads to improved performance across all three measures.
5 Conclusion
This paper introduced a framework for inter-organizational process mining based
on secure multi-party computation. The framework enables two or more parties
to perform basic process mining operations over the partial logs of an inter-
organisational process held by each party, without any information being shared
besides: (i) the output of the queries that the parties opt to disclose; and (ii) three
high-level log statistics: the number of traces per log, the number of event types,
and the maximum trace length. The paper specifically focuses on the computation
of the DFG, annotated with frequency and temporal information. This is a basic
structure used by process mining tools to perform various operations, including
automated process discovery and various performance analysis queries (e.g. top-k
bottlenecks and least-frequent and most-frequent flow dependencies).
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To mitigate the high performance overhead commonly observed for secure
multi-party computation, we introduced two optimizations over the basic DFG
computation algorithm: one based on vectorization of the event log and the other
based on a divide-and-conquer strategy, where the log is processed in chunks.
An evaluation using real world event logs shows that with these optimizations,
it is possible to compute the DFG of real-life logs with execution times that
make this technique usable in practice. The divide-and-conquer approach provides
opportunities to scale up the proposed technique by using a map-reduce execution
style, however not to a sufficient level to enable interactive process mining (which
requires execution times in the order of seconds). In future work, we will explore
further optimizations, for example by taking into account metadata about the
event types in the event log where hand-offs occur between participants. If such
event types are known, and usually they are since these events correspond to
message exchanges, it becomes possible to split the logs into a “private” part
and a “public” part (the latter being the points where hand-offs occur), and to
process them separately using different approaches.
Another avenue for future work is to combine the proposed approach with
approaches that provide complementary guarantees such as differential privacy
techniques. The latter techniques allow us to noisify the DFG or to the outputs of
the queries of the DFG in order to limit the information leaked by these outputs.
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